I n this paper we introduce a new type of demand function, the "conditional demand function," and apply it to a number of probleins in the theory of consuiner behavior. I n Section I we define conditional demand functions; these express the demand for a good as a function of its own price, the prices of some (but not all) other goods, total expenditure on these goods, and the quantities of the remaining goods. Conditional demand functions are directly relevant to the analysis of consuiner behavior in the short run, when fixed coii~iliit~~ients prevent instantaneous adjustinent to the longrun equilibriuin and to the study of consumer behavior under rationing. In Section I1 we show hon-conditional denland functions are related to ordinary denland functions (demand as a function of all prices and inconle I .
In Section I11 IT-e s l i o~-liow tlie cross price derivatives of the ortlinary demand fuiictions can be decomposed into a "pure substitution effect" ant1 a "money expenditure effect"; this decoin~~osition differs froin the t r a d~t~o n a l Slutsky-Hicks decon~position and is, at least for soiiie problems, inore convenient. The proposed decomposition enables us to use our knowledge of own price elasticities and to take syste~natic account of tlie fact that if the demand for a good 1s elastic iinela>t~c) an iiicrcaac in it? price will tend to incarca>e( dccrcu.cl of other gooclb tiic c~onauii~~)t~on In Section IT n e consictcr tlie tlieoi y of conhumer beliarior under rationing Vsing conditional dci~lantl function?, new and very sirnple proof5 of the Tobin-Houthakker theorems are developed. I n Section V we use ronditional deinand functions to examine the implicit maximization procedure wl~icli underlies the Hicksian aggregation theorcm. Finally, in Section VI we present a simple proof of Samuelson's Le Cl~atelier Principle and establish an analogous theorcm for uncoinpensated price changes.
I n this section JTC introduce conditional dernand functions and examine some of their uses. \Ye begin by imagining that one good, say the nth, is not available on tlie market and is allocated independently of the market mechanism. Before entering the market, an intiividual is allotetl son~e quantity of the nth good; he is not allowed to sell any of liis allotment, nor can he supplement i t by purchases on tlie market. T e describe this situation by saying that the nth good is "~~reallocated" and we denote the individual's allotii~ent by 2, '. \Ye assume that thc individual's preferences can be represented by a well-behaved ordinal utility function, C(xl, . . . , r,,), where
x, denotes hi* consumption of the ith good.' TYe assume that the first n -1 goods arc available on the inarket a t prices over rvhich the individual has no control, and that his total expenditure on these goods, A, is also predetermined. The individual is supposed to cliuose quantities of the first n -1 goods so a5 to li~axiiiiize G ( r l , . . . , 2,,1 subject to the "budget constraint"
It -1
(1.1)
and the additional constrair~t (1.2) x, = r,,", n-liere p, denotes the price of the it11 good. Tlie utility maxilnizing quantities of each of the first n -1 goods depend on the prices of these goods, total expenditure on them, and the allotment of the preallocated good. \Ye express this by writing (1.3) 2, = g""(11, . . . , p,,-l, A, xnH)
1. By a wc.11-behaved ort1in:il utility function we mean one ~\-llicli satisfies tlie following 1.el.y ,strong regularity conditions. Let S denote the vector ( x l , . . . , x ,~) .We require and we call 9''" the "conditional demand function" for the ith good. The second subscript, n, indicates that the nth good is preallocated; the terminology is suggested by that used for conditional probability.
If the individual's allotment of the preallocated good remains fixed, his conditional demand functions meet all the requirements satisfied by ordinary demand functions. This can be seen most easily by absorbing the constraint (1.2) into the utility function and defining a new "conditional utility function," V (zl, . . . , x , -~) , by
If C is a well-behaved ordinal utility function defined over the n-dimensional cominodity space, then V is a well-behaved ordinal utility function defined over an (n -1)-dimentional commodity space; hence, the deinand functions arising from V are homogeneous of degree zero in pl, . . . , pn-l and A, and the matrix of implied Slutsky-Hicks terms, S = [sy], where is symmetric and negative semidefinite.
JJTe next consider the case in which more than one good is preallocated. Suppose the commodities are partitioned into two subsets, 8 and 8", where the commodities in 8" are preallocated and those in 0 are available on the market. Let XW,, denote the vector of preallocated goods, and let At denote total expenditure on the goods available on the market. The individual is supposed to maximize U(x,, . . . , x,) subject to the "budget constraint"
(1.5) 2 p,xi = A, i e R and the additional constraints (1.6) x , = x t W irBY. The individual's demand for a good available on the market will depend on the prices of the goods available on the market, total expenditure on thein, and the individual's allotn~ents of the preallocated goods. Thus, we have conditional denland functions (1.7) xi = g"," (PB, A@, X*,.) where Pgdenotes the vector of prices of the goods available on the market. These conditional demand functions, like (1.3), are homogeneous of degree zero in Poand A@ and the implied matrix of Slutsky-Hicks terms is symmetric and negative semidefinite.
Conditional demand functions are an appropriate tool for analyzing consumer behavior in several situations. The most obvious of these is consumer behavior under rationing which is discussed in Section IV. T' l' e conclude this section by discussing other situations in which conditional deinand functions are useful.
Consumers, like firnls, have comnlitinents which are fixed in the short run, so it is uscful to distinguish between long-run and short-run consuiner behavior."or example, if an individual signs a lease to rent an apartment for twclve months, his consuillption of housing services during any month is fixed and the amount he can spend on gootls and services other than housing is his total expenditure less his fixed expenditure on h o~s i n g .~ If housing is the individual's only fixed comn~itinent, his denland for goods and services other than housing depends (in the short run) on the prices of these goods and services, his total expenditure on them, and the "quantity" of housing wliich he is collnnitted to consume. Since his consuinption of housing is fixed, it is the conditional denland functions which are appropriate for the analysis of his demand for goods and services in the short run.
Conditional deinand functions can also be used to deal with nonmarket goods. For example, the availability of goods provided by the governinent without charge to the user may affect the individual's preference between collections of goods available on the market. I n this case, variables representing the availability of goods of this type will appear as arguinents of the individual's utility function and his demand functions. Thus, the availability of free public tennis courts may affect the way an individual allocates a given total expenditure between tennis balls and other goods.
Conditional deinand functions can also be used to analyze the effect of leisure on the consumption of goods. Even if the number of hours an individual works is institutionally determined, so that he is not faced wit11 a labor-leisure choice, it is necessary to include leisure in the utility function if leisure is "related" to the goods available on tlie market. That is, if the number of leisure hours an individual has affects his preference between collections of goods available on tlie market, then leisure must appear as an argument of his utility function and his deinand functions. In this way, the effect on the consunlption of goods available on the market of cllanges in tlie institutionally determined nun~ber of leisure hours nrailal>lc car] I>c analyzed.
I n this section we consider the relation between conditional demand functions and ordinary demand functions.
Ordinary denland functions are found by maximizing c71x1, . . . , x,,) subject to the budget constraint
where I denotes total expenditure, hereafter called income. The utility il~axiinizing values of the x's are functions of all prices and income, and we write 12.2)
where P denotes the vector (p,, . . . , p,), and h 5 s the "ordinary clemand function" for t21c it11 good. Xow suppose that the 71th good is preallocated a t tlie level h u ( P , I ); that is, the individual's allotil~ent of the 71th good is preciqely the amount of that good which he would choose to buy at prices P wit11 incoi~ie I. Suppose that his total expenditure on the goods available on tlle market is I -p,,hn(P,I); that is, llis total expenditure on the first 71 -1 goods is precisely the ainount he would cl~oose to spend on these goods a t prices P wit11 income I . In this situation the individual will purchase the same quantities of each of the first n -1 goods as he would purchase if the 17th good were not preallocated and he faced prices P with income I. That is 12.31
n.here ( 2 4 ) a(P,I ) = I -p,hn(P, I ) . Tliis identity is an iillillediate consequence of the definitions of oi,tiinary dcinand functions and conditional demand functions as solutions to constrained inaxiinization problems.
A result siinilar to (2.31 holds when more tlian one good is preallocatctl. T1.c let Hp"IP, I ) denote the vector of ordinary demand function. for the prcallocatccl goocls. Total expcndlture on the goods in BY i i 2 p,hl(P,I ) ant1 total expenditure on the goods in 6 is given i E I l l hy (2.51 a" = a H ( P , I )= I -d p , h l ( P , I ) .
I n tliis case conditional demand functions are related to ordinary demand functions by the identity (2.6) hi(P, I ) = gb'B" [PB, aB(P, I ) , H O" ( P , I ) ] where a8 is defined by (2.5) and P8 denotes the vector of prices of the goods in 8.
T17e conclude tliis section by introducing the notation we shall use for i(compensated deliland functions." Consider tlie basket of goods \vliich achieves a given level of utility, U , a t inininlum cost; the cost minimizing values of the x's are functions of all prices and the level of utility to be achieved. Thus, we write
where f' is the "compensated demand function" for the ith good.
It is well known t h a t compensated demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in all prices and that the matrix of their partial derivatives is symmetric and negative semidefinite. This implies for all i,j and for all i. It is also well known that the partial derivatives of the compensated demand functions are related to the partial derivatives of the ordinary demand function by
In tliis section n e use conditional demand functions to derive n useful decomposition of tlie cross price derivatives of tlie ordinary deliland functions. We begin with the identity (2. This decomposition has a simple interpretation in terms of (2.3). A change in p, affects x, in two ways. First, i t causes a change in x, which in turn causes tlie individual to reallocate the money lie was spending on the first n -1 goods among these goods; the effect on 2, of this reallocation is the pure substitution effect. Second, the change in p, causes a change in total expenditure on the first n -1 goods; the effect on x, of this change is the money expenditure effect. Adding these two effects together yields the total change in xi induced by the change in p,.l
The change in a, caused by the change in x, -the pure subasi.. ahn stitution effect -is represented by --. The first factor a x n a p n represents the effect on x, of a unit change in 2,; the second represents the cliange in x,, induced by the change in p,,: Unless the nth a h " ag;. 11
good is a Giffen good, is negative, but -may be positive, a x n negative or zero. Since this factor represents tlie change in xi caused by a change in x,, under the assumption that total expenditure on t,he first n -1 goods is held fixed, an increase in the consumption of one good must be counterbalanced by a decrease in the consumption of others. We may establish this result more formally by differentiating the identity
We use the following terminology to describe the sign of
4. For finite price changes, a different decomposition is obtained if we take the two terms in opposite order. That is, a change in p, affects xi in two ways: first, it causes a change in total expenditure on the first n -1 goods; the effect on X I of this change in expenditure (with x, held fixed a t its original level) is the money expenditure effect. Second, the change in p,, causes a change in x, which causes the individual to reallocate his expenditure on the first n -1 goods among these goods; the effect on xr of this reallocation is the pure substitution effect. For infinitesimal price changes, the two decompositions are equivalent. Ambiguities of this sort are inevitable in interpreting decompositions based on partial derivatives in finite terms, and similar problems arise in interpreting the traditional Slutsky-Hicks decomposition. (Cf. fn. 8, p. 69.) (a) if ax > 0 we say that xi is posit,ively related to x k ,
say that xi is unrelated to x k , and axk (cl if --< 0 we say that xi is negatively related to xk. axk a g " k I suggest elsewhere that the sign of -can be used as the basis axk for a useful tlf,finition of related goods.5 We remark that "xi is positively related to x," does not imply "xk is positively related to xi.''
The change in z,caused by tlie change in A -the money ex-
asi-&
penditure effect -is represented by --. The first factor a A apn represents tlie cliange in x, which would be caused by a unit change in expenditure on the first n -1 goods while the second represents tlie change in expenditure caused by tlie cliange in p,.
The effect on x, of a unit change in expenditure on the first n -1 goods, --, may be positive, negative or zero; but the positive aA tcrms must outweigh the negative ones, since an increase in total expenditure on the first n -1 goods must lead to an increase in expenditure on a t least one good. This result may be established more formally by differentiating (3.21 with respect to A.
The change in expenditure on the first n -1 goods induced by the change in p, is clearly tlie negative of tlie change in expenditure on xn induced by the change in p,. Formally, differentiating (2.4) with respect to p, and factoring out hn yields where En, denotes the own price elasticity of the nth good. Thus, if the demand for x, is elastic, an increase in p, causes a decrease in cxpenditure on x, and an increase in A.
There are two central cases which are particularly easy to analyze using tlie new decomposition :
( i ) If the demand for the nth good is unit elastic, the money expenditure effect is zero and we have Thus, an incrcase in the price of the nth good will cause the consumption of the itli good to decrease (remain the same) (increase), 5. Robert A. Pollak, "Two Essays in the Theory of Consumer Behavior," 07). cit., pp. 100-119.
if the ith good is positively related (unrelated) (negatively related) to tlie nth good.
(ii) If the itli good is unrelated to the nth good, the pure substitution effect is zero and we have Thus, if the ith good is "normal" (i.e., if an increase in total expenditure on the first n -1 goods causes an increase in tlie consumption of the ith good), then an increase in the price of the nth good will cause consumption of the ith good to decrease (remain the same) (increase), if the demand for the nth good is inelastic (unit elastic) (elastic). I t can be shown that every good is unrelated to every other good if and only if the utility function can be written in an additive form.G More generally, conditional demand functions provide a convenient tool for analyzing tlie implications for consumer behavior of separable ~t i l i t y .~ Of course, tlie situation becomes more complicated when we move beyond these two central cases. Nevertheless, tlie proposed decomposition (3.1) enables us to make systematic use of the fact that if the demand for a good is elastic (inelastic) an increase in its price will tend to increase (decrease) tlie consumption of other goods.
Let us consider the case in which the demand for tlie ntli good is elastic. I n tlris case, a n increase in the price of the nth good leads to a decrease in expenditure on that good and hence releases money to be spent on other goods. Of course, tlris does not mean that the consumption of every other good must increase. The response of a particular good to the increase in p, will depend not only on the sign of -aa , but on its magnitude and on --, and -ahn .
% a A ' ax, an
Nevertheless, some useful inferences can be drawn from (3.1). For example, if the ith good is "normal1' (i.e, *> 01, tlren tlie money aA expenditure effect will be positive. Unless tlie pure substitution effect is sufficiently negative to outweigh tlie positive money expenditure effect, tlie consumption of the it11 good will increase. This can only happen if the it11 good is positively related to the ntli good (so a decrease in consumption of the ntli good causes a decrease in 6. Robert A. Pollak, "Two Essays in the Theory of Consumer Behavior," op. cit., pp. 120-31.
7. Robert A. Pollak, "Implications of Separable Utility," mimeo.
consumption of tlie it11 good) and if this effect is large enough to make the negative pure substitution effect outweigh the positive money expenditure effect. The traditional Slutsky-Hicks decomposition of the cross price derivative ah' ar;
is an immediate consequence of (2.10). The first term, -apn called the "substitution effect" and represents the effect on the ith good of a compensated change in the price of the nth good. The ah' second term, -hn-, is called the "income effect" and represents a1 the effect on the ith good of the change in "real income" (i.e., utility) caused by the change in the price of the nth good. Thus, the traditional decomposition divides the movement from the old to the new equilibrium into two steps, the first representing a movement along the original indifference curve to its point of tangency with the new price line and the second a movement from this point to the new equilibrium on the new indifference curve.8
There is no necessary relation between the "pure substitution effect" and the "Slutsky-Hicks substitution effect." The SlutskyHicks substitution effect keeps utility constant, while the pure substitution effect increases utility if the change in p, causes an increase in x,, and decreases it if xn decreases. It should also be remarked that the traditional decomposition is valid in a two good world, while the proposed decon~position requires a t least three goods. Although (3.4) is useful in proving several important theorems, it is not of much use as a vehicle for incorporating a priori information about the structure of preferences and the relations among goods. It is simply too difficult to visualize the characteristics of one's own coi~lpcnsated demand function. Conditional demand functions, on the other hand, are a relatively simple concept; if anything, they are easier to visualize than ordinary demand functions. Thus, they provide a convenient vehicle for making use of a priori information about the structure of preferences.
IV. CONSUMER BEHAVIOR UNDER STRAIGHT RATIONING
Conditional demand functions are directly relevant to the theory of "straight" or "specific commodity" rationing. Under straight rationing, a different type of ration coupon is required for each rationed good, so we lose no generality by dispensing with ration coupons and expressing the ration constraints in terms of the maximum quantities which the individual is permitted to buy.
We denote the set of rationed goods by B* and the set of unrationed goods by 0. If the kth good is rationed, we let xk* denote the maximum quantity of the kth good which the individual is permitted to buy and XIB. the vector of ration constraints. Pe8.denotes the vector of prices of the rationed goods, P, the vector of prices of the unrationed goods, and P the vector of all prices: P = (P,, Ps,).
The individual maximizes U(xl, . . . , xm) subject to the budget constraint (2.1) and the ration constraints (4.1) xk <xr* k c 0' .
If there are any unrationed goods (and we assume that there are), an inequality in the budget constraint would be only a mathematical nicety. But the inequalities in (4.1) are crucial. The demand for both the rationed goods and the unrationed goods depends on all prices, income, and the ration constraints. We denote these demand functions by (4.2) X~= R~'~( P , I , X * , , ) .~=~, . . . , n .
If the kth good is rationed, and its ration constraint is binding, we have (4.3) Rk'@'(P, I,X*@.) = xk* k r B*, but we must be cautious of the assumption that ration constraints are binding-indeed, a given set of ration constraints clearly cannot be binding for all price-income situations.
Let us consider a price-income situation (P', 1') in which all of the ration constraints (x*',,) are binding, and examine the relation between ration demand functions and conditional demand functions a t this poinLg By hypothesis, consumption of each rationed 9. The assumption that all ration constraints are binding is somewhat stronger than we require. If we consider price-income situations in which some of the constraints are not binding, we could treat rationed goods whose ration constraints are not binding as unrationed goods and redefine e and 8* accord-good is equal to the corresponding ration constraint, so expenditure on tlie rationed goods is Zp,' xi;*' and expenditure on the unrationed k e 8* goods, which we denote by A', is given by (4.4) A' = I' -2pk'xkK'.
Since the individual will purchase quantities of the unrationed goods so as to maximize U(xl, . . . , x,,) subject to the constraints and (4.6) 21, = xIiY' k c B* the ration demand functions (4.3) are related to tlie conditional demand functions (1.7) by (4.7)
R"@*(Pr, Ir,X*',,) = g' #* (PrB, A' , X Y r 8 , ) where A is defined by (4.4). Tliat is, the demand for an unrationed good may be written as a function of the prices of all unrationed goods, total expenditure on tlie unrationed goods, and the individual's rations of eacli of tlie rationed goods.
If tliere exists a neighborhood of the point (P', I', S*',,) in which all of the ration constraints are binding, then (4.8)
R' "(P, I, X5.) = gi Ox(PB, a$,XO.) holds as an iclentity in that neighborhood, where a5 is defined by \Ye assuillc tliat such a neigl~borliood exists, and differentiate (4.8) with respect to pj, I, pi; and xi;, where j c 9 and k c B*. This yields From (4.10bj and ( 4 . 1 0~) it follows that \TTe shall make use of (4.11) below; but we remark that it depends ingly. Whai we really require is a priori knowledge of which ration constraint.3 :n-c binding and whicll are not. This is, of course, a very strong requirement.
crucially on the assulnption that these partial derivatives are evaluated a t a point at which all of the ration constraints are binding.
We now derive the Tobin-Houthakker theorems relating the partial derivatives of the ration demand functions under a regime of straight rationing to the partial derivatives of the ordinary demand functi0ns.l The scope and applicability of these theorems is very limited, for as Tobin and Houthakker point out, these theorems are valid only if the ration constraint for each rationed good is set a t the free market equilibrium level of that good. That is xl;" = hk(P,I ) k c B".
We let HB"(P, I ) denote the vector of ordinary demand functions of the goods in 8". Clearly we have the identity (4.12) hi(P,I ) = R"B*(P,I , H@* (P,I )) .
aRi'B*
Differentiating with respect to pj and I and solving for -and 3Ri.B" a p j we obtain a1 3Ri.B" ah; aRi+ ahk If only one good, say the nth, is rationed we have aR' ah' aR'ahn 
aPn
That is, if the only rationed good is the nth good, the effect on the it11 good of a change in the ration is equal to the ratio of (i) the change in consuinption of the ith good induced by a compensated change in the price of tlie nth good, and (ii) the change in the nth good induced by a compensated change in its own price. Tlic Tobin-Houthakker results are somewhat treacherous becnusc, strictly speaking, the ration demand functions are not differentiable at tlic point specified in the theorem. The difficulty is that thc ration constraints arc binding a t the point specified in the theorem, hut not in any neighborhood of that point. Hence, a small decreasc in any ration will cause a change in the equilibrium consurrlption pattern, hut an increase in any ration will cause no change. This problem is alllidcd to hy Tobin and Houthakker, who observe that "our recults strictly corrcspond to the usual meaning of 'rationing' only for thosc changcq in thc determinants of demand which 3. Scc Tohin and Houthnkkcr, 071. cit., p. 142, and Tobin, op. cit., p.
528.
4. Tohin and Houthakker, op. cit.,p. 144.
cause the free demand for every rationed good to exceed t,he ration."
The Hicksian Aggrcgation Theorem states that if the prices of the goods in some subset always change proportionally, then the goods in that subset may bc treated as a single good. Conditional demand functions can be used to exhibit the implicit maximization procedure which underlies this theorem.
Suppose that the goods are partitioned into two subsets, O and OX. Let P g denote the vector of prices of the goods in 0, and let X B and XO, denote the vectors of goods in 0 and 0" respectively. If thc prices of the goods in e are always proportional to P i (i.e., Po= hPBIr), the Hicksian composite commodity, M, is defined by hhf(h,Po,, I ) = 2 p'khk(hP',, P,,, I ) kc@ are demand functions (i.e., the matrix of implied Slutsky-Hicks terms is symmetric and negative semidefinite).
Instead of approaching Hicksian aggregation from the demand function side, we sliall begin with the utility function and show that if the prices of the goods in 6 are always proportional to Prs,then we can represent the individual's utility function, U(XB, X,,), by an aggregate utility function, U* ( M ,X,.) . The formulation of the Hicksian aggregation theorem in terms of the utility function is directly relevant to the most common use to which the theorem is put, namely, tlie analysis of n-commodity problems by means of two dimensional indifference curve diagrams.
TITe begin by showing that if the prices of the goods in 6 are fixcd at PrB, we can represent tlie individual's utility function, U(X,, X,,) , by an aggregate utility function, U* ( M ,So,) . (111.X,,) by assuming that M is allocated among tlie goods in 6' so as to maximize U(Xo, X,,). It can be verified directly that U Xis a well-behaved utility f~n c t i o n .~ If the prices of the goods in 6 are given by Po = AP' B,then total expenditure on the goods in 6' is given by A = AM, since 1 1 1 is defined in terms of basic prices, Pro, and not actual prices, Po. By the argument used above,
hut since conditional demand functions are homogeneous of degree zero in prices and total expenditure, this clearly reduces to (5.4). In tcrnis of tlic utility function, Hicksian aggregation works because we can associate with ( M ,So.) a unique point in the cominodity space, [G80" (P',, Jf,. X,, 1, S,,] , and, hence, a unique level of utility, (5.41. As we have just slio~vn, the point in the commodity space and the level of utility are independent of h.
VI. THELE CHATELIER AKD BEYOND PRIKCIPLE
In this section me present a new and very simple proof of Saniuelson's Lc Chatelier Principle and consider the analogous recult for unconipcnsated pricc changes. We begin by dcfining compensated denland functions under tlie assumption that one good is preallocated. Su1)pose that tlie ntli good is preallocated and consider the basket of goods which achieves a given level of utility at miniinu~il cost, subject to the constraint x,,= x",,.The quantities of the various goods will be functions of the prices of the goods a,vailable on the market, tlie quantity of thc preallocated good, and the level of utility to be achieved. Thus, (6.1) X, = .?"(PI, . . . , PW-I) XI,, U ) .
Tliese "conditional coiilpensated demand functions" bear tlie same relation to tlic "con(litiona1 utility function" as the compensated demand functions to tlic utility function. Therefore, they must satisfy conditions analogous to (2.8) and (2.9), namely 6. 1.e.. that i t snti,-fies the requirements of f n . 1, p. 61.
--and
The Le Chatelier Principle asserts a relationship between the own price partial derivatives of the compensated demand functions and the own price derivatives of tlie conditional compensated demand functions. 1101-P exactly, if a,, is preallocated at the level hn( P ,I ) ,then That is, the response of a , to a compensated change in pi is larger in absolute value when z, is free to vary than when zn is held fixccl at hn ( P ,I) .
San~uelson'sproof of this theorem requires the manipulation of cumbersome Jacobians and the use of Jacobi's tlieoren~,but an al-]nost trivial proof is possible using conditional clemancl functions.
We begin by observing that the compensated demand functions and the conditional coiilpensated demand functions are related by the identity (6.5) f'(P, U ) = f"" (p,, . . . , p,,-1, p ( P , L') , L') i = 1 , . . . n -1 .
Tliis is sirnply an assertion that the cost minimizing level of a , is tlie same when z,, is fixccl at its optillla1 level as it is wllen a,, is free to vary. Differentiating (6.5) with respect to p, and p, wc obtain 3Y.n Solving (6.7) for -, 2nd substituting into (6.6) we obtain the it11 and the nth goods are independent in the Slutsky-Hicks sense. This result can ilillnediately be extended to situations in which lliorc tlian one good is held fixcd (at its equilibrium level, of course). Thus, the argument used to establish (6.8) clearly can be used to ~1 1 0~~
The Le Cllatelier tlieorelil t 6 . 8 ) refers only to coillpensated price changes; we now consider the analogous problelll for uncom-1)cnsatccl pricc cllanges. If TIC interpret the conditional denland function, yf ", as a short-run clcmand function ~vlicrc fixed commitiilents prevent tlie individual froill varying liis consuinption of x,,, then long-run deliland is lllorc elastic than short-run demand if and only if tlie expression is negative. As wit11 conipensated c1er:iancl functions, we ~vish to eztablish a local result ~vllicli liolcls for slriall price changes when x,, is lleld fixed at its equilibriuln level, h n ( P ,I apn The dcnoininator of (6.13I is negative. Tllc nuinerator is positive if and only if a coi1:pensated change in pi and an uncompensated change in p, cause r,, to cliange in tlic same direction. That is, if t l~c nth good is held fixed ( a t its cquilibriuni level), the deliland for 8. This ~.e>ult coulcl also he r-tablitlied by differrntiating the identity aR t'" (4.12) 1%-it11 1.ey1ect to I ) , , ant1 .substituting fro111 (4.10a) and (4.16) for - 
